In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS The Logic of God Incarnate. By THOMAS V. MORRIS. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986. Pp. 220. $19.95. Thomas V. Morris, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, has written a technical yet provocative study on the Incarnation. As a faithful Christian he believes in and desires to defend the traditional Christian doctrine of the Incarnation proclaimed in the New Testament and defined (...) by the early councils of the Church, especially Chalcedon, that is, that Jesus is the One eternal Son existing in two natures. He also holds that, while the truth of the Incarnation is revealed, it must nonetheless stand the test of logic and reason. The Incarnation cannot be illogicaJ or meaningless. " If the church has been guided by God in such matters as the formulation of its creeds, conciliar decrees, and catechisms,.... we would not expect glaring logical flaws in its central doctrinal affirmations" (p. 46). The stated purpose of Morris's study is to defend the traditional doctrine against those who would hold it to be logically incoherent and meaningless. "In the course of thinking about the Incarnation for some years now, I have come to see that a few simple metaphysical distinctions and a solid dose of logical care will suffice to explicate and defend the doctrine against all extant criticisms of a philosophical nature" (p. 9). Morris meticulously analyzes and critiques a number of arguments that oppose the possibility of coherence of the Incarnation by attempting to demonstrate that such arguments are.either false and illogical themselves, or that they do not apply to a true understanding of the Incarnation. Moreover, Morris proposes a novel understanding of the Incarnation which he believes is both logical and intelligible, and which conforms to the Christian tradition. This goal of upholding the intelligibility of the Incarnate leads Morris to a three-fold task. He first of all must refute his chief adversaries, those who would deny the sensibleness of saying God became man in Jesus. Such critics deny the validity of the Incarnation on the ground..'! that it is meaning·less, and the'l'efore impossible to juxtapose the incommensurable. attributes of divinity and humanity, e.g., perfection/imperfection, immutability/corruptibility. They hold that Jesus could not have had both these sets of properties at once (cf. p. 20). Morris refuses to capitulate to such arguments. He nevertheless insists that any solution to the issue which would undermine human logic or which would fail to uphold the Christian's belief is no solution at all (cf. p. 32). 367 368 BOOK REVIEWS Secondly, Morris's task leads him to refute any attempts at a " OneNature " solution, which would "squash" together the human and divine natures in Jesus to form a single nature. Such proposals jeopardize either the integrity of Jesus's divinity (Arianism) or his humanity (Docetism, Monophysitism), inevitably composing a mythical tertium quid (cf. pp. 33-38). Morris presents a clear case against such corruptions of the Incarnation. Thirdly, Morris's task brings him to analyze contemporary kenotic Christology. He thoroughly discusses this approach, for the reason that it is directly involved in the issue at hand, namely, the incompatibility between divine and human properties in Christ. Secondarily, however, Morris's interest in kenoticism reflects his own hope that some variation of the approach might posibly arrive at a Christological solution (cf. p. 92). While he ultimately rejects kenoticism, Morris flirts with the various alternatives, and, as we shall see, his own perception of the Incarnation remains tinged with a kenotic flavor. How then is it possible to predicate of one and the same individual divine and human attributes intelligibly and coherentlyT To use contemporary computer jargon, the question might be phrased: is it possible that God and man can he "incarnation-friendly¥" Morris believes so. Morris first of all sets out to define the terms-divine nature and human nature. He believes part of the incompatibility problem lies in attributing to Jesus's humanity unnecessarily hostile aspects. He distinguishes between being "merely human" and being "fully human"· To be " merely human " is to possess not only those properties that narrowly define one's nature or kind, such as rationality, but... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE CASE FOR SPIRIT CHRISTOLOGY: SOME REFLECTIONS THOMAS WEINANDY, O.F.M., CAP. Greyfriars Hall, University of Oxford IN THE JUNE, 1992, issue of Theological Studies Roger Haight, S.J., of the Weston School of Theology, authored an essay entitled "The Case for Spirit Christology." 1 In the December, 1992, issue of the same journal John Wright, S.J., of the Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley, wrote a critical response (...) entitled: "Roger Haight's Spirit Christology." 2 While I fully endorse Wright's reservations, here I wish to offer some of my own criticisms as well as expand upon some of his.3 In order for a Spirit Christology to be viable Haight believes that it must fulfill six criteria: 1) It must adequately explain why Christians believe that their salvation is found in Jesus; 2) It must be faithful to the Bible; 3) It must uphold the teaching of the Councils, especially Nicaea and Chalcedon; 4) It must be intelligible and coherent; 5) It must respond to contemporary concerns, specifically the relationship of Jesus to the founders of other 1 Roger Haight, S.J., "The Case for Spirit Christology," Theological Studies 53(1992): 257-287. Hereafter referred to in the text by page numbers. 2 John Wright, S.J., "Roger Haight's Spirit Christology," Theological Studies 53(1992) : 729-735. 3 While this article will focus exclusively on Haight's Spirit Christology, much of what will be said here, by way of criticism, can be applied equally to other expressions of Spirit Christology, since the various forms are quite similar. Haight himself relies heavily upon and substantially agrees with G. W. H. Lampe, " The Holy Spirit and the Person of Christ," in Christ, Faith and History, ed. S. W. Sykes and J. P. Clayton (Cambridge: University Press, 1972) 111-130; and God as Spirit (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977). For other recent examples of Spirit Christology see Haight's footnote 1, p. 257. 173 174 THOMAS WEINANDY, O.F.M., CAP. religions; 6) It must be able to stimulate and empower Christian life (see 260-262). As in Wright's response, I wish to examine I-Iaight's Spirit Christology in light of these criteria. I will begin with an extensive examination of Haight's second criterion-faithfulness to scripture-for it is most central to his whole enterprise. Then, more succinctly, I will address his other criteria. Biblical Revelation and Religious Language The central, and therefore fatal, flaw within Haight's Spirit Christology is that his understanding of '.' God as Spirit," upon which the whole of his Christology is founded, is itself non-biblical. To discern Haight's understanding of " God as Spirit," we must first examine his notion of religious language and the philosophy sustaining it. For Haight, "the medium through which religious experience takes place may be called a symbol, making all religious knowledge symbolic knowledge. A symbol is that through which something else is made present and known; a symbol mediates a perception and knowledge of something other" (263). While the symbol makes the presence of God known, yet, precisely because it is a symbol, God is beyond or transcends what is symbolized. The symbol " both makes God present and points away from itself to a God who is other than itself" (263). Thus the symbolized " is" and " is not" the symbol (263). Haight argues then that the biblical symbol, " the Spirit of God " refers to God and is " materially and numerically identical with God. God as Spirit is God" (266). However, God as Spirit " indicates God at work, as active, and as power, energy, or force that accomplishes something" (266-267). God as Spirit refers not to God as he is immanent in himself, but to God as he is "outside of himself," within the order of time and history. Haight recognizes that the Old Testament also uses " Word" and " Wisdom" as symbols along with " Spirit," but " all of these symbols are basically the same insofar as they point to the same generalized experience of God outside of God's self and im- THE CASE FOR SPIRIT CHRISTOLOGY 175 manent in the world in presence and active power" (267). While Haight acknowledges that these symbolic... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE IMMANENT AND THE ECONOMIC TRINITY THOMAS WEINANDY Greyfriars Hall Oxford, England I N HER MAJOR study on the Trinity, God For Us: The Trinity and Christian Life, Catherine Mowry LaCugna contends that theology should abandon the distinction between the immanent and the economic Trinity as it has been understood within contemporary theology. She believes that such a distinction segregates " God in himself " from " (...) God for us " and thereby fixes an unbridgeable gap between them. This divorce renders the Trinitarian God irrelevant to the Christian life. In contrast, LaCugna proposes-and this is the theme of her entire bookthat the whole trinitarian enterprise must be executed within a soteriological context.1 Since the Council of Nicea, however, the history of the development of the doctrine of the Trinity has focused, both in the East and in the West, on the immanent Trinity and the intradivine relationships between the persons. This is especially true of Latin trinitarian theology where Augustine and Aquinas founded their trinitarian conception on substance and articulated a trinity of persons who are enclosed upon one another.2 The more theology developed the doctrine of the immanent Trinity, 1 Catherine Mowry LaCugna, God For Us: The Trinity and Christian Life (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1991). See pp. 15, 211. 2 With reference to the Western conception of the Trinity in contrast to the East, LaCugna comments: " However, the economy of salvation a Patre ad Patrem becomes all the harder to see once the consubstantiality of persons is situated in the intradivine domain, or beyond, in a permanently unknowable and imparticipable divine essence" (ibid., p. 73). For comments on how Augustine 's trinitarian thought brought about a rupture between God in himself and God for us see pp. 80, 91, 97, 101-02, 104. For a similar criticism of Aquinas see pp. 157, 167-68. 655 656 THOMAS WEINANDY the more the doctrine of the Trinity became irrelevant. LaCugna completes her lengthy, and often insightful, study of the historical development of the doctrine of the Trinity by concluding: " The history of doctrine and theology tells the story of the emergence and defeat of the doctrine of the Trinity." 3 Even if one argues, as Rahner and many others do, that the immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity, the very distinction still places a gulf between God as he exists in himself and the God who exists for us.4 There remains, according to LaCugna, a separation between theologia, that is, knowledge and speculation about God qua God, and oikonomia, that is, knowledge and speculation about God-for-us. For LaCugna, if theologia is to be relevant it must be inherently and thoroughly soteriological. Hence it follows that theologia can only be theologia of the oikonomia, that is, a theology of God's action within the world. A theologia of the Trinity must then be a theologia of the trinitarian pattern of God's self-revelation within the economy. Her governing principle is : " theologia is fully revealed and bestowed in oikonomia, and oikonomia truly expresses the ineffable mystery of theologia." 5 [The economy is not] a mirror dimly reflecting a hidden realm of intradivine relations; the economy is God's concrete existence in Christ and as Spirit. The economy is the 'distribution' of God's life lived with and for the creature. Economy and theology are two aspects of one reality: the mystery of divine-human communion.6 Thus the Trinity that is revealed is not a Trinity apart or distinct from the economy, but a Trinity of the economy. " The referent for the immanent Trinity is not 'God in se,' or 'God's essence as it is in itself.' Theories about what God is apart from a Ibid., p. 198. Also, pp. 209-10, 392. 4 LaCugna gives a clear exposition of Rahner's position on the distinction and relationship between the immanent and economic Trinity (cf. ibid., pp. 211-21). She concludes: "Finally, according to Rahner at least, distinctions in the economy originate in and are grounded in distinctions ' in ' God. It is on the last point that we part ways with Rahner" (p. 221). 5 Ibid., p. 221. a Ibid., p. 222. IMMANENT AND ECONOMIC TRIN11'Y 657... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS The Incarnation of God: An Introduction to Hegel's Theological Thought as Prolegomena to a Future Christology. By HANS Kii'NG. Translated by J. R. Stephenson. New York: Crossroad, 1987. Pp. 601. $37.50 (cloth bound). This is an imposing book (first German edition, 1970), not only in length, but in breadth of presentation. Kiing, in the introduction, outlines the philosophical, theological and cultural milieus out of which Hegel's theology (...) and philosophy emerged. In the next 400 pages (seven chapters), Kiing thoroughly articulates the historical development of Hegel's theological and philosophical thought as expressed in his successive writings, specifically examining and evaluating the christological elements. Kiing's final chapter interprets Hegel's Christology in light of recent biblical historical/critical methodology, by way of a prolegomenon to a future Christology. The book concludes with five integral historical/theological excursus which take up specific questions that arise out of this Hegelian enterprise, for example: "Does God suffer?," "The Dialectic of the Attributes of God," "Immutability of God?". In the preface to this English edition, Kiing states that the purpose of this work is to "provide theologians with an introduction to Hegel's theological and christological thought.... [It will be] a many-leveled 'invitation' into Hegel's life and 'thought, with particular reference to his religious world, and then into his theology and Christology " (p. ix). "Moreover,.this book is an introduction to Hegel's thought by way of 'prolegomena to a future Christology '. In ·these pages we endeavour to return... a provisional reply that will take us some way in the right direction" (p. x). Why did Kiing look to Hegel for the clue to a future Christology? His thesis is that "the biblical message concerning a God who is by no means separated from the world but rather operates within it, and who is by no means stuck immovable and immutable in an unhistorical and suprahistorical realm but rather performs living acts in hi&tory can be better understood [along the lines of Hegelian thought] than in terms of the metaphysics of either classical Greece or the middle ages" (p. xii). Any student of historical or philosophical theology/christology will be captivated by Kiing's treatment of.the development of Hegel's ilhought. Undoubtedly he has mastered Hegel's life, writings and 698 694 BOOK REVIEWS thought, and presents these in a clear, complete and engaging manner. Kiing notes that Hegel, beginning with his student days at Tiihingen, was influenced by three strong cultural and intellectual currents: the Enlightenment as it specifically culminated in the thought of Kant, the French Revolution, and the rise of the Romantic movement. Kiing shows that, while the young Hegel was acquainted with the Bible, and even,though he already displayed an interest in the role of religion (folk religion) as formative of society, nowhere was he "seized in a lively and inward fashion by the Christian faith, by the figure of Christ himself" (p. 54). To rthe contrary, Hegel's early experience of Christianity was lifeless and joyless. During his subsequent time in Bern, Hegel's evaluation of Jesus un· derwent a transformation. Hegel became fascinated with Greek religion, not because it was true, but because it embodied the culture and spirit of the people. Developing this train of thought, he stated that "The supreme end of man is morality, and his religious bent is pre· eminent among his aptitudes for promoting that end" (p. 69). In light of this, Hegel considered Jesus,to lack the humane and universal scope of Socrates, who was " the paradigm of a free, good and humane Hellenism and of harmony with nature, world and state " (p. 63). Jesus' teaching was too much an authoritarian imposition upon people rarther than, like Socrates', a nurturing of their inner spirit and life. Shordy, as reflected in his Life of Jesus, Hegel's view of Jesus was to change. Now he was placed above Socrates, not because he was acknowledged to be the eternal Son of God, nor because he reconciled mankind to God by his death on the cross, but rather because he per· sonified the divine ideal of virtue that is so necessary for social order. " Whart is... (shrink)

Social scientific reasoning (SSR) is essential to social science education and to a democratic society as a whole. Students are challenged to analyze and reason about social problems such as social inequality, crime, and poverty. However, students experience difficulties with SSR. This study addresses the research question: Which design principles can guide teachers in designing lessons that promote social scientific reasoning? In this design-based research, four social science teachers employed a conceptualization of SSR and its levels together with three initial (...) design principles to develop curriculum materials and activities. These design principles and curriculum materials were piloted in two secondary education classes (9th and 10th grades) and evaluated by four social science teachers, four social science teacher educators and 90 students. The study produced six design principles that can promote students’ SSR. In combination with the curriculum materials, those design principles can help develop teachers’ pedagogical content knowledge and guide the design of tasks and units that develop SSR. (shrink)

We extend the relational algebra of Chin and Tarski so that it is multisorted or, as we prefer, typed. Each type supports a local Boolean algebra outfitted with a converse operator. From Lyndon, we know that relation algebras cannot be represented as proper relation algebras where a proper relation algebra has binary relations as elements and the algebra is singly-typed. Here, the intensional conjunction, which was to represent relational composition in Chin and Tarski, spans three different local algebras, thus the (...) term distributed in the title. Since we do not rely on proper relation algebras, we are free to re-express the algebras as typed. In doing so, we allow many different intensional conjunction operators. We construct a typed logic over these algebras, also known as heterogeneous algebras of Birkhoff and Lipson. The logic can be seen as a form of relevance logic with a classical negation connective where the Routley-Meyer star operator is reified as a converse connective in the logic. Relevance logic itself is not typed but our work shows how it can be made so. Some of the properties of classical relevance logic are weakened from Routley-Meyer’s version which is too strong for a logic over relation algebras. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AN EXPLICATION OF THE DE HEBDOMADIBUS OF BOETHIUS IN THE LlGHT OF ST. THOMAS'S COMMENTARY HE WRITINGS o:f Ancius Manlius Severinus Boehius exercised a powerful influence on the nature and evelopment o:f mediaeval philosophy. The extent of his influence was such that I think it fair to say that anyone seeking more than a superficial grasp of mediaeval philosophy must acquire some first-hand knowledge of his work. The (...) trouble is, however, that while The Corwlsation of Philosophy is well-known and much commented upon, Boethius's other works are relatively neglected.1 Included in this latter group are the five theological tractates, one of which has this imposing title: Quomodo Substantiae In Eo Quad Sint Bonae Sint Cum Non Sint Substantialia Bona. This tractate also has the more managable title De Hebdomadibus and it is as such that I shall refer to it throughout this article.2 I have chosen to give an explication of the De Hebdomadibus for three reasons. First the problem with which it deals (the nature of the relation between goodness and substance) is intrinsically interesting and Boethius's solution to the problem is a model of philosophical analysis. Second, in addition to the fact that the philosophical status of the nine axioms listed in the tractate is a matter of some scholarly controversy, the answer to the obvious question of how these axioms function in the tractate as a whole is not at all clear. And third, this tractate is philosophically significant to those philosophers who take St. 1 I am obliged to Professor Ralph Mcinerny for awakening my interest in Boethius and for his suggestion that the De Hebdomadibus would repay careful study. 2 All references are to the H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand edition of The Theological Traotates and The Consolation of Philosophy, in the Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1973). 419 420 GERARD CASEY Thomas as their inspiration since it appears that St. Thomas's existence/essence distinction is adumbrated here. I shall begin my explication by giving a brief overview of the main lines of the tractate. Then I shall lay out the arguments contained in the statement and resolution of the dilemma which Boethius constructs, indicating (by means of Roman numerals in parentheses ) where I think particular axioms are meant to apply. Finally, I shall display the axioms as perspicuously as possible and comment on them. Overview The groundplan of the De Hebdomadibus is as follows. It begins with a brief introduction which contains the nine axioms. Then the problem to be considered is outlined in the form of the following dilemma. Things which are are good. This is the basic assumption which will generate the dilemma. Things which are good are so either by virtue of their substance or by participation. If they are good by virtue of their substance then, since God is the only substantial good, we arrive at an impious conclusion: we identify creatures with their Creator. lf they are good by participation then we generate a contradiction : things do and do not tend toward the good. Therefore, the conclusion must be that things which are are not good, which manifestly contradicts the basic assumption. Boethius's solution to the dilemma makes use of a thought-experiment. Abstracting from the first good he distinguishes locutions such as ' to be ' from locutions such as ' to be good.' On the basis of this distinction he is led to conclude that goodness is either a property of things or a principle of things. Re-introducing the notion of the first good, he notes that it is good by virtue of its very being. Secondary goods are also good by virtue of their being but only because that being derives from the will of the first good. Boethius cautions us against likening the being of particular things to the being of the first good and concludes the tractate by considering and refuting two objections to his solution. THE DE HEBDOMADIBUS IN THE LIGHT OF ST. THOMAS 421 The theme of the tractate is the problem of how substances can be good in virtue of their being without, at the same time... (shrink)

_The first comprehensive one-volume collection of St.Thomas More’s writing__ “[A] tremendous scholarly undertaking.... Accessible and transparent to both scholars and the general audience.”—_Renaissance and Reformation__ In this book, Wegemer and Smith assemble More’s most important English and Latin works for the first time in a single volume. This volume reveals the breadth of More’s writing and includes a rich selection of illustrations and artwork. The book provides the most complete picture of More’s work available, serving as a major resource (...) for early modern scholars, teachers, students, and the general reader. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:In Memory Thomas FarrellOn June 12, 2006, Thomas Farrell died after a long illness. Tom was Professor of Communication Studies at Northwestern University and a long-standing member of the journal's editorial board. He was appointed by the journal's founding editor, Henry Johnstone, and Henry regarded him as among the most talented minds writing about our common subject. Tom also was a publishing author in Philosophy and Rhetoric. (...) His research refl ected a deep understanding of the intersections of philosophical thought and rhetoric with respect to argumentation, language, speech acts, and political theory. His award-winning book, Norms of Rhetorical Culture (Yale, 1993), is a testament to the insights afforded by the rapprochement between philosophy and rhetoric that has been the journal's defi ning character. With his passing, the inter-discipline has lost one of its most eloquent and accomplished voices, the journal has lost a contributor and editorial advisor of the first rank, and those of us who knew Tom have lost a dear friend, whose intellect and wit always brightened our moments together.Copyright © 2006 The Pennsylvania State University... (shrink)

The main purpose of this second article devoted to T. Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century (the first was published in the previous issue of Actuel Marx) is to introduce our alternative reading of history. The tendencies manifest during the last decades of the 20th century and the early 21st century are not, it is argued, the replication of the tendencies which prevailed prior to World War I. The starting-point for our analysis is the beginning of the 20th century, a (...) moment characterized by the dynamics of a “managerial capitalism” built around the “tripolar” class pattern of capitalists, managers, and popular classes. The main quantitative manifestation of these trends was the steady rise in the share accounted for by wages (compared to capital income) in the income of upper classes (notably the top 1 percent). In place of Piketty’s impact of shocks, we focus on the chain of successive configurations of class domination and alliances, in a succession of “social orders” marking the historical advance of managerial capitalism : the first financial hegemony, in the years leading up to the Great Depression ; the postwar social-democratic compromise ; and its successor, neoliberalism, involving a new alliance to the right, between the managerial and popular classes. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AN EXPLICATION OF THE DE HEBDOMADIBUS OF BOETHIUS IN THE LlGHT OF ST. THOMAS'S COMMENTARY HE WRITINGS o:f Ancius Manlius Severinus Boehius exercised a powerful influence on the nature and evelopment o:f mediaeval philosophy. The extent of his influence was such that I think it fair to say that anyone seeking more than a superficial grasp of mediaeval philosophy must acquire some first-hand knowledge of his work. The (...) trouble is, however, that while The Corwlsation of Philosophy is well-known and much commented upon, Boethius's other works are relatively neglected.1 Included in this latter group are the five theological tractates, one of which has this imposing title: Quomodo Substantiae In Eo Quad Sint Bonae Sint Cum Non Sint Substantialia Bona. This tractate also has the more managable title De Hebdomadibus and it is as such that I shall refer to it throughout this article.2 I have chosen to give an explication of the De Hebdomadibus for three reasons. First the problem with which it deals (the nature of the relation between goodness and substance) is intrinsically interesting and Boethius's solution to the problem is a model of philosophical analysis. Second, in addition to the fact that the philosophical status of the nine axioms listed in the tractate is a matter of some scholarly controversy, the answer to the obvious question of how these axioms function in the tractate as a whole is not at all clear. And third, this tractate is philosophically significant to those philosophers who take St. 1 I am obliged to Professor Ralph Mcinerny for awakening my interest in Boethius and for his suggestion that the De Hebdomadibus would repay careful study. 2 All references are to the H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand edition of The Theological Traotates and The Consolation of Philosophy, in the Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1973). 419 420 GERARD CASEY Thomas as their inspiration since it appears that St. Thomas's existence/essence distinction is adumbrated here. I shall begin my explication by giving a brief overview of the main lines of the tractate. Then I shall lay out the arguments contained in the statement and resolution of the dilemma which Boethius constructs, indicating (by means of Roman numerals in parentheses ) where I think particular axioms are meant to apply. Finally, I shall display the axioms as perspicuously as possible and comment on them. Overview The groundplan of the De Hebdomadibus is as follows. It begins with a brief introduction which contains the nine axioms. Then the problem to be considered is outlined in the form of the following dilemma. Things which are are good. This is the basic assumption which will generate the dilemma. Things which are good are so either by virtue of their substance or by participation. If they are good by virtue of their substance then, since God is the only substantial good, we arrive at an impious conclusion: we identify creatures with their Creator. lf they are good by participation then we generate a contradiction : things do and do not tend toward the good. Therefore, the conclusion must be that things which are are not good, which manifestly contradicts the basic assumption. Boethius's solution to the dilemma makes use of a thought-experiment. Abstracting from the first good he distinguishes locutions such as ' to be ' from locutions such as ' to be good.' On the basis of this distinction he is led to conclude that goodness is either a property of things or a principle of things. Re-introducing the notion of the first good, he notes that it is good by virtue of its very being. Secondary goods are also good by virtue of their being but only because that being derives from the will of the first good. Boethius cautions us against likening the being of particular things to the being of the first good and concludes the tractate by considering and refuting two objections to his solution. THE DE HEBDOMADIBUS IN THE LIGHT OF ST. THOMAS 421 The theme of the tractate is the problem of how substances can be good in virtue of their being without, at the same time... (shrink)

In his many and varied writings, St Thomas presents us with both a sophisticated account of human action and a complicated moral theory. In this article, I shall be considering the question of whether St Thomas’s theory of action and his moral theory are mutually consistent. My claim shall be that St Thomas can preserve the ontological unity of human action—but only at the cost of rendering it extremely difficult to evaluate in a manner consistent with his (...) moral theory, or, alternatively, that he can provide a viable ethical analysis of human action—but only at the cost of compromising its ontological unity. In the first section of this article I shall examine St Thomas’s account of a particular kind of moral action, namely lying. Two basic questions concerning the specificity of unicity of human action will emerge from this examination: 1) what makes an act to be a specific moral act?, and 2) what makes a specific moral act to be one act? In the second section of the article I shall attempt to show, by means of a textual examination, that St Thomas does not appear to be able to provide an account of human action that will satisfactorily answer both these basic questions at the same time. (shrink)

(2003). Rethinking Kuhn's legacy without paradigms: some remarks on Steve Fuller's Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for Our Times. Social Epistemology: Vol. 17, No. 2-3, pp. 153-156. doi: 10.1080/0269172032000144108.

[Note: Picture of Peirce available] Charles S. Peirce’s Philosophy of Signs Essays in Comparative Semiotics Gérard Deledalle Peirce’s semiotics and metaphysics compared to the thought of other leading philosophers. "This is essential reading for anyone who wants to find common ground between the best of American semiotics and better-known European theories. Deledalle has done more than anyone else to introduce Peirce to European audiences, and now he sends Peirce home with some new flare."—Nathan Houser, Director, Peirce Edition Project Charles S. (...) Peirce’s Philosophy of Signs examines Peirce’s philosophy and semiotic thought from a European perspective, comparing the American’s unique views with a wide variety of work by thinkers from the ancients to moderns. Parts I and II deal with the philosophical paradigms which are at the root of Peirce’s new theory of signs, pragmatic and social. The main concepts analyzed are those of "sign" and "semiosis" and their respective trichotomies; formally in the case of "sign," in time in the case of semiosis. Part III is devoted to comparing Peirce’s theory of semiotics as a form of logic to the work of other philosophers, including Bertrand Russell, Wittgenstein, Frege, Philodemus, Lady Welby, Saussure, Morris, Jakobson, and Marshall McLuhan. Part IV compares Peirce’s "scientific metaphysics" with European metaphysics. Gérard Deledalle holds the Doctorate in Philosophy from the Sorbonne. A research scholar at Columbia University and Attaché at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, he has also been Professor of Philosophy and Head of the Philosophy Department of the universities of Tunis, Perpignan, and Libreville. In 1990 he received the Herbert W. Schneider Award "for distinguished contributions to the understanding and development of American philosophy. In 2001, he was appointed vice-president of the Charles S. Peirce Society. Contents Introduction—Peirce Compared: Directions for Use Part I—Semeiotic as Philosophy Peirce’s New Philosophical Paradigms Peirce’s Philosophy of Semeiotic Peirce’s First Pragmatic Papers The Postscriptum of 1893 Part II—Semeiotic as Semiotics Sign: Semiosis and Representamen—Semiosis and Time Sign: The Concept and Its Use—Reading as Translation Part III—Comparative Semiotics Semiotics and Logic: A Reply to Jerzy Pelc Semeiotic and Greek Logic: Peirce and Philodemus Semeiotic and Significs: Peirce and Lady Welby Semeiotic and Semiology: Peirce and Saussure Semeiotic and Semiotics: Peirce and Morris Semeiotic and Linguistics: Peirce and Jakobson Semeiotic and Communication: Peirce and McLuhan Semeiotic and Epistemology: Peirce, Frege, and Wittgenstein Part IV—Comparative Metaphysics Gnoseology—Perceiving and Knowing: Peirce, Wittgenstein, and Gestalttheorie Ontology—Transcendentals "of" or "without" Being: Peirce versus Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas Cosmology—Chaos and Chance within Order and Continuity: Peirce between Plato and Darwin Theology—The Reality of God: Peirce’s Triune God and the Church’s Trinity Conclusion—Peirce: A Lateral View. (shrink)

In vitro fertilisation (IVF) daily practice reveals that couples are willing to take greater risks than doctors if there is a higher chance of pregnancy. Arising from this is a frequently addressed issue regarding the embryo transfer strategy: single or double embryo transfer? The dilemma is faced by patients, as well as physicians, who are caught between the possibility of no pregnancies at all and facing the prospect of iatrogenic twin gestation. How could the couple's preferences concerning how many children (...) they would like be taken into account in determining the number of embryos transferred? How should the physician exercise his medical responsibility towards his patients and the unborn child? An effective approach could be to enhance a couple’s autonomy by advocating a medical beneficence that incorporates patients’ values. This can be achieved through a case-by-case approach in a deliberative process of decision-making which includes real patient-centred communication. (shrink)

The author argues that Thomas G. Weinandy in his book Does God Suffer? starts from the axiom of divine apathy, rather than that he argues for it. He criticizes the hermeneutic implicit in Weinandy’s interpretation of 1 Samuel 15, and proposes an alternative approach. Moreover, he criticizes Weinandy’s appeal to agreement among the church fathers and his appeal to the doctrine of the Trinity.

Arthur Danto is the Johnsonian Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Columbia University and the most influential philosopher of art in the last half century. As an art critic for The Nation for 25 years and frequent contributor to other widely read outlets such as the New York Review of Books, Danto also has become one of the most respected public intellectuals of his generation. He is the author of some two dozen important books, along with hundreds of articles and reviews (...) which have been the center of both controversy and discussion. In this volume Danto offers his intellectual autobiography and responds to essays by 27 of the keenest critics of his thought from the worlds of philosophy and the arts. The book includes 16 pages of color art reproductions. Danto is the author dozens of books on art, philosophy, the philosophy of art, and art criticism. He is a rare philosopher who is also a public intellectual. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Jesus Becoming Jesus, Volume 2, A Theological Interpretation of the Gospel of John: Prologue and the Book of Signs by Thomas G. WeinandyDaniel A. KeatingJesus Becoming Jesus, Volume 2, A Theological Interpretation of the Gospel of John: Prologue and the Book of Signs by Thomas G. Weinandy, O.F.M. Cap. (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2021), xviii + 484 pp.This is an unusual biblical (...) commentary. By his own account, Fr. Weinandy had set out to write a fully orbed systematic theology. While in the process of giving a "respectful nod to Scripture" as a prelude to his systematic study, he found himself caught up and engrossed in the biblical text—and never managed to extricate himself. Changing course, he decided to write "a theological or doctrinal interpretation of the New Testament." Volume 1 of this effort covers the Synoptic Gospels (2018). In this second volume, Weinandy turns his attention to the Fourth Gospel, his aim being "to discern the theological and doctrinal content of John's Gospel" (x).Perhaps the most unusual quality of this study is the complete absence of any secondary literature. Though the author has read commentaries on the Gospels, both ancient and modern, he chose not to consult any other scholars (or ecclesiastical writers) in composing this doctrinal commentary. Given his focused aim—a theological and doctrinal study of the Gospels—he wanted to avoid getting caught up in contemporary scholarly exegetical debates. And so there are no footnotes to secondary sources (a thing probably welcome to many readers).Weinandy alerts the reader at the start concerning his particular approach to this study of the Gospels. Fascinated throughout his career as a systematic theologian with the notion of "act" (and especially with God as "pure act"), he approaches the Gospel narratives primarily from the perspective of Jesus's actions. Specifically, he intends to explore how Jesus "enacts" [End Page 738] his name, "YHWH-Saves," through the saving mysteries revealed in the narrative of the Gospels. Thus the title of his multi-volume work, "Jesus Becoming Jesus," serves as the overarching theological theme of the entire effort. This is how he explains his methodology of "act" and "enactment" in his first volume: "Jesus more and more becomes Jesus in act through his saving acts; he becomes more and more the Savior. He definitively becomes Jesus-in-act with the actions of his saving death and resurrection, which will find completion when Jesus comes in glory at the end of time" (xix). With such attention given to Jesus's actions, Weinandy admits that Jesus's teaching does not receive the same attention. It is not that he ignores Jesus's words, but they function primarily as pointers to Jesus's acts.And yet in another sense, the endpoint of this commentary is to show the Trinity-in-act. "The Father is fatherhood fully in act; the Son is sonship fully in act; and the Holy Spirit is love fully in act. This threefold perichoretic act is the one God fully in act" (xiv). As Jesus progressively enacts his name and identity, so too are the Father and the Spirit revealed according to the "acts" that reflect their hypostatic identities. A consistent feature of this commentary is the sustained attention given to how the Father and the Spirit are involved in the saving actions of Jesus, the Word made flesh. Congruent with this view of the Trinity's perichoretic act, Weinandy often adopts what might be called a "perichoretic syntax," whereby he presents a single reality from the distinct perspectives of the divine persons, restating the same truth in mutually enhancing ways. This grammatical-syntactical style of the commentary is admirably suited to its theme.If we are looking for parallels to this theological-doctrinal approach in the Christian tradition, the commentaries on the Gospel of John by Cyril of Alexandria and Thomas Aquinas come to mind. Like Weinandy, they each work through the Gospel text passage by passage, explaining the meaning of each section, but they are characterized by an overarching doctrinal concern: to present the entirety of the Christian faith through the words of John's Gospel and to... (shrink)